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Abstract 
Directive 2010/63/EU on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes (henceforth 
“the Directive”) mandates that every project proposal in EU member states involving 
procedures on living non-human vertebrates and cephalopods must be approved in a project 
evaluation which includes a harm-benefit-analysis assessing “whether the harm to the animals 
in terms of suffering, pain and distress is justified by the expected outcome taking into account 
ethical considerations and may ultimately benefit human beings, animals or the 
environment”. This project evaluation is carried out by competent authorities, with the advice 
of committees whose composition varies across Europe. The committees usually include 
scientific and veterinary/animal welfare expertise. They also often have experts in legal and 
ethical issues, advisors on alternatives to animal experiments, and sometimes also lay people. 
This invites the question: How do committee members understand “ethical considerations”, 
and how does this influence their evaluation and their advice to competent authorities? This 
is important, for decision-making in project evaluation is restricted and must fall within the 
boundaries of the applicable legal regulation. We argue that committee members are not 
always aware of this restriction. Genetic enhancement (e.g. for better modelling of human 
diseases in larger animals) and disenhancement (e.g. genetically reducing research animals’ 
ability to suffer) are controversial procedures in animal research. Where these two procedures 
are concerned, the mainly consequentialist and pathocentric legal framework of the Directive 
will potentially contradict the personal beliefs of some committee members, and indeed some 
members of the public, about what is morally permissible in animal research. Both genetic 
enhancement and genetic disenhancement could be classified as a valid benefit by the 
Directive, but some committee members might consider them morally unacceptable as a 
result of their personal beliefs. We use this potential conflict to address the question of what 
happens when committee members are of different opinions; we explain how, under these 
circumstances, a standardised understanding of “ethical consideration” can be achieved. We 
argue that, since project evaluation must comply with the normative framework of the 
Directive, the law always trumps objections based on personal and public beliefs that are in 
turn based on non-pathocentric and non-consequentialist moral theory. Our argument and its 
implications can be summarised as follows: First, the authorising committee’s benefit 
evaluation, “taking ethical considerations into account”, is restricted to by limits given in the 
regulation. However, second, it is far from clear that committee members understand what 
this means. Third, genetic disenhancement and genetic enhancement are arguably two 
paradigmatic cases where the personal beliefs of committee members will potentially 
contradict the Directive, and thus where there is real risk of illegal project evaluation. To 
minimise this risk, committee members should be trained and educated about their role and 
responsibilities in project evaluation. Only then will it be safe to assume that they are carrying 
out their authorising role appropriately. 
 1. Introduction 
Directive 2010/63/EU (henceforth “the Directive”) on the protection of animals used for 
scientific purposes requires every project proposal in EU member states with procedures 
involving living non-human vertebrates and cephalopods to be approved in a review process 
(1). The review evaluates whether the project is justified from a scientific or educational point 
of view (predicted scientific or educational benefit), whether the purpose justifies the use of 
animals, and whether the project is designed to be performed in the most humane way 
possible (1, article 38). The project evaluation also assesses the severity classification of the 
procedure (1); and it checks compliance with the principle of the 3Rs (2) (replacement, 
reduction, refinement), which states that animal use is only authorised if the research goal 
cannot be achieved using alternative non-animal methods, or with cognitively “less 
developed” species, fewer animals and/or less harmful methods. 
This part of the evaluation, which is largely scientific and involves rather well-defined project 
criteria, requires scientific expertise. But the project evaluation also includes a so-called harm-
benefit analysis (HBA), to assess “whether the harm to the animals in terms of suffering, pain 
and distress is justified by the expected outcome taking into account ethical considerations, 
and may ultimately benefit human beings, animals or the environment” (1, article 38 d). Here, 
ethical considerations are applied to determine whether the goal of the experiment is 
sufficiently important to justify the harms caused to the animals. This assessment mirrors the 
idea that experiments – even if they are perfectly sound according to scientific criteria – may 
be disproportionate and should thus be rejected.  
In practice, responsibility for carrying out the HBA falls to national authorities. Therefore, 
member states have set up competent authorities to regulate and administer the evaluation 
and authorisation of animal research projects.3 This means that authorisation may be granted 
by a single person working at a governmental agency, while the evaluation is usually carried 
out by a group of people, or (henceforth) “committee”, with diverse backgrounds and areas 
of expertise. On the committee there may be scientific researchers, veterinary/animal welfare 
experts, NGO representatives, lay people, and others.3 The competent authorities (advised by 
committees) decides whether the requirements of article 38 mentioned above are met. This 
decision is not solely scientific in nature – it involves an evaluation which “takes ethical 
considerations into account” in weighing harms against expected benefits. 
The scientific evaluation mentioned in the first paragraph above is relatively well defined. It is 
much less clear what is to be understood, within an HBA, by “taking ethical consideration into 
account”. In no small part, this is because the Directive is silent on the meaning of “ethical 
considerations”. There is a risk, given this interpretative vacuum, that the evaluations of 
advising committees will be influenced by personal beliefs. In what follows we shall explain 
why this is problematic, referring to the role of regulatory ethics and the principle of legality. 
We will go on to identify specific roles for committee members, and to indicate limitations on 
what they and the competent authorities are permitted to consider in making project 
evaluations.  
 
2. The Role of committee members in project evaluations, and limits to the factors they 
should consider  
As mentioned above, the authorisation of project proposals in an HBA depends on the 
weighing of expected benefits against expected harms, “taking ethical considerations into 
account”. We shall argue that the role of ethical considerations here is limited to the 
boundaries of the legal framework (4). Our argument is based on the “principle of legality”, 
which requires all laws in constitutional states to be clear and ascertainable. On this principle, 
authorities must decide on legal matters by applying explicit legal rules (4). In the case of 
animal research, this implies that decision-making on the permissibility of research proposals 
has to be based on, and is limited to, the normative framework of the Directive – i.e. 
authorities and committees carrying out a harm-benefit analysis, and thus “taking ethical 
considerations into account”, are limited in their decision-making by implicit and explicit 
normative criteria created by the Directive. Importantly, this means that personal beliefs, or 
widely held public beliefs, that are not compatible with the given legal framework must not 
be allowed to influence the decision-making process. The ethical considerations that are valid 
within a legal framework have been termed “regulatory ethics” (4). 
Now, to understand the role of ethical considerations in the Directive, competent authorities 
and advising committees have to understand what moral theory the Directive is based on. The 
Directive, with its focus on the 3Rs principle and on weighing harms against benefits, appears 
to be based mainly on pathocentric and consequentialist moral theory (although the upper 
limit of permissible pain is a deontological exception to this that is worth noting (4, recitals 
23)). Within this normative framework, the use of animals is morally acceptable as long as the 
pain, distress and suffering is outweighed by expected benefits, and as long as the pain, 
distress and suffering does not go beyond a specific threshold which is considered to be 
impermissible irrespective of the potential benefits of the project. Importantly, the Directive, 
when it mentions harm, pain, distress and suffering, is almost exclusively concerned with 
sentient (negative) experiences and omits non-sentient forms of harm such as major 
interference with an animal’s appearance or capacities, humiliation and excessive 
instrumentalisation (these are referred to in the Swiss regulation (5), for example). 
This has important scope implications: it limits the opinions, moral theories and objections 
that can legally be considered in decision-making connected with project evaluation. 
Specifically, personal or widely held public beliefs, and moral reasons that are incompatible 
with the normative framework of the Directive, which might merit consideration in a different 
context, such as moral philosophy or politics, must not interfere with decision-making on a 
legal basis in project evaluation: decisions must be based exclusively on pathocentric and 
consequentialist moral theory. 
 
3. Genetic modifications of research animals 
In the following discussion we will use fictional (but realistic) examples of genetic 
enhancement and disenhancement in research animals to illustrate the way in which the 
personal beliefs of committee members, the attitudes of the authorities, and moral theories, 
might create objections to the normative framework of the Directive. We will ask what 
implications these objections might have for project evaluation – in other words, we will 
discuss whether the concepts of harm underlying the objections are relevant within the 
framework of the Directive. 
With the advent of CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats) gene 
editing6 has become unprecedentedly precise, cheap and easy. The technique can be used not 
only in mice, but also in non-human primates, where it now makes genetic modification 
feasible. The generation of genetically modified large animals is especially interesting for 
those working on neurological diseases. Rodents often fail adequately to recapitulate the 
human disease phenotype here, and therefore rodent studies have limited clinical potential 
(7). But now, by genetically manipulating non-human-primates, knowledge can be generated 
which a) cannot be gained in other species, and b) is crucial in the development of new 
treatments for human diseases. In this article, we use the term “genetic enhancement”. We 
do so because concern has been expressed that genetic modification of the brains of “higher” 
species potentially enhances (or even “humanise”) their cognitive abilities.8 (We should note 
in passing that we are not necessarily convinced that, in these higher animals, cognitive ability 
and the capacity to suffer is increased. However, for the sake of the argument we shall assume 
this is so. Importantly, if our argument is sound for animals whose capacity to suffer and 
cognitive abilities are increased, it will also be sound for other animals.) 
Paul Thompson coined the term “animal disenhancement” to refer to genetic modifications 
which reduce animals’ capacities in ways that allow them to better suit their environment (9). 
With the recent advances in our understanding of the molecular processes underlying pain 
physiology, in the near future CRISPR could potentially make it feasible to genetically modify 
research animals to reduce or erase their ability to feel pain and suffer (10,11,12,13). The aim will 
be to modify the affective dimension of pain (so-called “caring about” the painful sensation 
(10) and/or chronic pain symptoms), while leaving the acute pain response intact (14). This 
would mean that while the animals suffer less, or not at all, they will still show “normal” 
guarding behaviour as well as “normal” species-specific behaviour as to their non-modified 
kin. 
 
3.1 Objections to genetic enhancement and disenhancement in animal research 
With their potential benefits in prospect, genetic enhancement of non-human primates (7,15,16) 
and genetic disenhancement of rodents (10,17) have both been presented as approaches 
opening up exciting new avenues of research. However, concerns have been raised about each 
of them. There is of course the general objection to all genetic modification of research 
animals on religious grounds, or on the basis that it is “unnatural”. From a deontological point 
of view it has also been argued that it is never morally permissible to use animals as a mere 
means. More specifically, Tom Regan’s animal rights theory entails that it is never permissible 
to use an “experiencing subject of a life” as a means to an end. From a virtue ethics or 
biocentric point of view, opponents would probably not approve of genetic modifications with 
a negative impact on the flourishing of the affected individual – a case in point here is the 
possibility that as a result of the highly developed cognitive abilities of non-human primates 
it might be difficult to house them adequately in a laboratory setting that allows them to 
flourish. Yet others are of the opinion that genetic interventions represent a violation of 
animals’ dignity, or a major interference with their appearance or abilities. Turning finally to 
cases where pain perception is genetically limited, opponents might raise the concern that 
this represents a technological fix for a moral problem, namely that the animals are suffering 
for scientific purposes in the first place. 
This list is by no means comprehensive – it could be much longer. It serves merely to illustrate 
the plethora of objections to the genetic enhancement and disenhancement of research 
animals. It is important to see that the objections are both non-sentientistic and non-
consequentialist in nature. However, by contrast the catalogue of examples given in Annex 
VIII of the Directive (1) to illustrate the severity classification of procedures demonstrates that 
the Directive is almost exclusively concerned with sentient forms of harm viewed in a 
consequentialist normative framework. There are two exceptions to this involving non-
sentient harm: “prevention from expressing natural behaviour including restrictions on the 
housing, husbandry and care standards” and “breeding genetically altered animals which are 
expected to have no clinically detectable adverse phenotype” (1, Annex VIII). Both are 
classified as “mild” pain, distress and suffering. Interestingly, all procedures classified as 
moderate or severe cause sentience-related forms of harm. Thus in the Directive non-sentient 
harms play only a minor role in determining pain, suffering and distress; sentience-related 
harms are given much more weight. From this it follows that the non-sentientistic objections 
we have listed above are treated as having no, or very little, relevance to project evaluation 
in the Directive. 
 
 
3.2 Potential harms caused by the genetic enhancement of non-human primates according 
to Directive 2010/63/EU 
The rationale for genetically modifying non-human primates in our example is that through 
such modifications better models of human neurodegenerative disease phenotypes with the 
potential to bring greater clinical benefits can be created. This raises the question: Within the 
framework of Directive 2010/63/EU, what potential harms and benefits of using non-human 
primates for modelling human neurodegenerative diseases are recognised?  
In addressing this question, we can point out, first, that the relevant modifications may 
enhance non-human-primates’ cognitive abilities and their ability to suffer. Second, non-
human primates seem to be given a somewhat higher moral status in the Directive than other 
animals (1, recitals 17, 33, 49, articles 8,31,32). The Directive states: “Due to their genetic 
proximity to human beings and to their highly developed social skills, the use of non-human 
primates in scientific procedures raises specific ethical and practical problems in terms of 
meeting their behavioural, environmental and social needs in a laboratory environment. 
Furthermore, the use of non-human primates is of the greatest concern to the public” (1, 
recital 17). The Directive also demands that non-human primates shall not be used unless “the 
procedure cannot be achieved by the use of species other than non-human primates” (1, 
article 8). From this it follows that their use, albeit restricted, is not prohibited. Their “higher” 
moral status, together with their greater potential to suffer, just means that the threshold for 
a positive evaluation regarding compliance with the 3Rs and the HBA is higher: The principle 
of “relative replacement” aims to replace larger and (supposedly) cognitively more highly 
developed species with rodents – at least, where the study objective can be reached in the 
cognitively less developed species. However, especially in the case of neurodegenerative 
disease it has been questioned whether this is possible in species other than non-human 
primates (7). Furthermore, as long as the increase in expected benefit – which, more often 
than not, is the rationale for using larger animals in the first place – outweighs the potential 
increase in suffering connected with the genetic modifications, the requirement of a positive 
HBA might still be met. The increase in suffering will create objections only if the relevant 
suffering increases beyond the permissible threshold of pain mentioned in the Directive. 
However, the painful, but still permissible, procedures listed in the Directive (1, Annex VIII) 
suggest that the genetic modifications involved in the study of neurodegenerative disease 
would not necessarily go above that threshold. From this it follows that genetically modifying 
non-human primates is, at least in theory, compatible with the framework of the Directive. 
Also, objectors would need to explain how the expected knowledge could a) be gained in a 
cognitively less developed species (relative replacement) or b) does not outweigh the 
(sentience-related) harm. Alternatively, they would need to show c) that the procedure 
exceeds the threshold of morally permissible pain. 
 
3.3 Potential harms caused by the genetic disenhancement of rodents according to Directive 
2010/63/EU 
Genetic disenhancement involves genetically modifying research animals so that they suffer 
less. Once again, this raises the question: Within the framework of Directive 2010/63/EU, 
what potential harms and benefits of genetically reducing rodents’ ability to suffer are 
recognised? 
The disenhancement could greatly reduce sentient forms of pain, distress and suffering. These 
are often classified as moderate or severe, and they include pain and suffering associated with 
“models of induction of tumours, or spontaneous tumours, that are expected to cause 
moderate pain or distress or moderate interference with normal behaviour; breeding of 
genetically altered animals which are expected to result in a phenotype with moderate effects; 
irradiation or chemotherapy with a sublethal dose” (1, Annex VIII). At the same time, genetic 
disenhancement could introduce harms that are classified as mild – e.g. harms associated with 
“prevention from expressing natural behaviour including restrictions on the housing, 
husbandry and care standards” and “breeding genetically altered animals which are expected 
to have no clinically detectable adverse phenotype” (1, Annex VIII). This suggests that the 
disenhancement would result in a net benefit, as judged on the consequentialist scales of the 
Directive, and comply with the 3Rs requirement: “refine” (without necessarily affecting the 
number of animals used), “reduce” (the numbers) and “replace”. It would at the same time 
help to secure a positive outcome in the HBA, since the amount of harm that would need to 
be outweighed will be greatly reduced. Thus, from the pathocentric and consequentialist 
standpoint of the Directive, there seems to be no objection to such genetic enhancement.  
To summarise, we have mentioned several objections which, theoretically, could be raised 
against the genetic enhancement or disenhancement of research animals. Many of these 
objections concern non-sentient forms of harm. However, as we have demonstrated, these 
objections have very little, or no, relevance within the pathocentric and consequentialist 
framework of the Directive. We have concluded that, in theory, both genetic enhancement 
and disenhancement are in compliance with the normative framework of the Directive. In the 
last part of this paper, we will discuss the implications of this for project evaluation. 
 
4. Legal regulation trumps personal beliefs and moral reasoning 
The objections mentioned above, while potentially of great relevance in the context of 
political, public and academic discussion, are of little significance in project evaluation. The 
Directive is almost exclusively concerned with sentient forms of harm. It offers no place for 
non-sentientistic and non-consequentialist objections to research procedures. However, the 
fact that these objections have been put forward suggests that they may be reproduced in 
advising committees. This is important, mainly for two reasons. First, as explained above, 
authorisation by competent authorities is based on the principle of legality, and it is limited to 
the normative boundaries of the legal regulation. Second, the competent authorities are 
advised (and influenced) by committees. This is especially interesting in the light of a study in 
Germany evaluating the work of committee members. In the study, approximately 20% of 
respondents based their ethical evaluation on “intuition and personal moral judgement” (18). 
Interestingly, almost 25% of the respondents raised concerns about “insufficient education in 
ethics and insufficient criteria for the evaluation” (18). This shows that committee members 
are not always aware of the legal limits of project evaluation and the moral theory underlying 
those limits, and would welcome assistance with ethical evaluations. The fact that members 
sometimes base their evaluation on personal beliefs raises the concern that the advice they 
give to the authorities is potentially being influenced by objections based on non-sentientistic 
and non-consequentialist considerations. As explained above, these objections have no, or 
very little, relevance in project evaluation within the normative framework of the Directive. 
The only objections that are to be weighed within the authorisation process are those based 
on pathocentric and consequentialist moral theory, and if, as it would appear, committee 
members are not always aware of this, they need training and education. Otherwise, there is 
a risk that their advice to the competent authorities will be incorrect, and that authorisations 
and rejections in project evaluation will be based on illegal grounds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Genetic enhancement and disenhancement raise ethical concerns that go beyond the 
pathocentric and consequentialist framework of the Directive. These concerns are likely to be 
shared, to an extent, by the committee members who advise the competent authorities in 
project evaluations. However, the principle of legality and the normative framework of the 
Directive require the competent authorities to base their authorisations and rejections 
exclusively on pathocentric and consequentialist moral theories that are compatible with the 
normative framework of the Directive. It would appear that committee members are not 
always aware of this restriction, suggesting that there are training and education needs here, 
and specifically that the role and limitations of competent authorities in project evaluation 
require clarification. Only then can it be safely assumed that the decision-making process will 
not go beyond the legal regulations. 
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